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ARGUMENT
I.

The PartiesT Stipulation That Brownys Compensatory Damages Totaled
$9.000 Bound The Trial Court And Precluded It From Entering A Verdict
Inconsistent With That Stipulation
The question this Court must address is whether the parties' stipulation that

Brown's compensatory damages would be limited to $9,000 should be enforced. "A stipulation
is an admission which 'may not be disregarded or set aside at will."' Rivera v. State Farm Auto
Ins. Co., 2000 UT 36, ^ 11, 1 P.3d 539; (citing DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595
(Utah App.1995); other citations omitted). "Ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations between
parties." First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah
1979). A party should be relieved from the effects of a stipulation ONLY where the mistake or
inadvertence which lead to the stipulation "is not due to [the party's] failure to exercise due
diligence and it could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care." Rivera: (quoting
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1265 (Utah 1983)). The Utah Supreme Court recently noted
that "there is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and entered
into with the advice of counsel." Id/, (citing Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App.
1989) and Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah 1985)). See also United Factors v. T.C
Assocs., Inc., 445 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1968) (refusing to set aside stipulation where "a lack of
full knowledge of the facts .. . was plainly due to [the] failure to exercise due diligence to
ascertain them").
In this case, Brown and her attorney agreed on the record in open court that the
damages awardable on the only claim submitted to the jury against Wardley and Richards should
be capped at $9,000. Brown now seeks relief from that stipulation by relying upon the trial

court's mistake and the jury's confusion and misunderstanding which resulted in a jury verdict
that conflicted with the stipulation. There is, however, no justifiable reason why Brown should
be relieved from the effects of her stipulation. Brown's brief, in fact, did not assert any basis to
disregard the stipulation. Instead, she argued that the jury verdict should be respected in spite of
its clear conflict with the stipulation. It is doubtful, however, that Brown would argue to ignore a
hypothetical stipulation regarding a minimum amount of damages if the jury had returned with a
verdict for less than the stipulated minimum. Without some rational basis to set aside or ignore
the stipulation, the jury's verdict should have been modified to reflect the terms of the stipulation.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Wardley relied upon the fact and
enforceability of that stipulation when it presented its defense. Wardleys conduct throughout the
remainder of the trial (after the stipulation regarding a cap on compensatory damages was
reached), its closing argument (which as Brown kindly points out did not include admonitions
regarding an appropriate measure of damages because of the stipulation) and its acquiescence to
the jury instructions given by the trial court were all impacted by and altered to conform with and
take advantage of the parties' stipulation. If this Court decides not to enforce the stipulation,
Wardley, should at least be given the opportunity to fully and fairly present a defense to Brown's
claims. Allowing the trial court, Brown and the jury to disregard that stipulation would result in
extreme injustice to both Wardley and to Richards. Enforcing the stipulation, on the other hand,
would give the parties exactly what they bargained for and expected, right up until the jury
returned with its verdict.
Brown's position in this case is quite similar to State Farm's position in the Rivera
case. In Rivera, State Farm stipulated to certain facts which it believed would support its legal

arguments. When the trial court returned a verdict adverse to State Farm, State Farm moved to
set aside the stipulated facts upon which the adverse finding was based. The Utah Supreme
Court, however, recognized that "State Farm's error in agreeing to the stipulated language arose
from a misjudgment of its legal position, not from a misunderstanding of what it was stipulating
to, as a matter of fact. It could clearly have been avoided by simply "exercis[ing] due diligence
and . . . ordinary care.'" Rivera at f 15; (citing Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1265). In the instant case
Brown's post-verdict desire to disavow the stipulation arises from her misjudgment of what the
jury could do, "not from a misunderstanding of what [she] was stipulating to, as a matter of fact."
Id. Brown, like State Farm, should not be allowed to rescind her stipulation and it should be
enforced by modifying the verdict to reflect its terms.
II.

Wardlev Did Not Ratify Richard's Allegedly Fraudulent Conduct
Ratification Requires Full Knowledge And The Intent To Ratify
"Ratification is premised upon the knowledge of all material facts and upon an

express or implied intention on the part of the principal to ratify." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649
P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). Ratification, maybe express or implied, but regardless, ratification
"requires the principal to have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify." Bullock v.
UDOT, 966 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah App. 1998); (citing lions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Utah 1988)). See also City Electric v. Dean Evans ChryslerPlymouth, 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983). Without knowledge there can be no ratification.
In the instant case there is no evidence that Wardley had full knowledge of any
false or misleading representations its independent contractor, Richards, had made to Brown.
Goff did speak with Brown about her complaints on two occasions. On those occasions Brown

complained to Goff about the sellers' and Richard's alleged misrepresentations regarding the roof,
the electrical system, the enclosed swimming pool, the appraisal and the inspection. The
magnitude and nature of Brown's dissatisfaction, along with the sellers' disavowal of any
knowledge of problems, prevented Goff from satisfactorily resolving her concerns. The failure to
resolve a complaining party's concerns, however, should not be deemed to provide a principal
with the knowledge or intent required for ratification of prior conduct. Knowledge of the
conduct, along with an intent to ratify it should be required.. In the instant case there was no
evidence that Wardley had "knowledge of all material facts and [the] intent to ratify" Richard's
conduct. IcL Without knowledge and intent, there can be no ratification. Without ratification,
damages cannot be awarded against Wardley and Wardley cannot be held vicariously liable for
the punitive damages awarded against its independent contractor, Richards.
The case relied upon by Brown, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 141
(Utah 1991) is not analogous to this action. In Hodges, Gibson's manager (Cosgrove) accused its
bookkeeper (Hodges) of stealing money which Cosgrove had actually taken. Criminal charges
were commenced against the bookkeeper on the testimony of Cosgrove, Gibson's auditor and
Gibson's general manager. A subsequent audit revealed Cosgrove as the actual thief and he
admitted to the crime. In spite of that admission, nobody at Gibson advised the prosecuting
attorney about Cosgrove's role in the missing funds or that Hodges was innocent of the charges
until the eve of trial, two months later. After the criminal charges were dismissed Gibson added
insult to injury by firing Hodges, who had been on suspension for eight months, for "failure to
follow proper procedures." Id_ at 155.

A managerial employee of Gibson had knowledge of the false accusations in
Hodges while an independent contractor/real estate sales agent was the only one with
knowledge of the allegedly false representations he made to Brown in this case. Gibson had
actual knowledge of the bookkeeper's innocence and of the falsity of Cosgrove's statements
supporting the charges against Hodges in Hodges while Wardley had no knowledge of the
improprieties involved in this case. Even with actual knowledge, Gibson failed to do
anything to remedy the injustice in Hodges, while Wardley never got that chance. Finally,
knowing Hodges had not done anything wrong, Gibson terminated her employment without
just cause, while no actions were taken by Wardley that detrimentally impacted Brown. The
significant differences between this case and Hodges provide an even greater reason for this
Court to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to find Wardley ratified Richard's conduct
at the heart of this case. Without ratification there can be no independent award against Wardley
and Wardley cannot be forced to pay the punitive damages awarded against Richards.
III.

Even If Wardley Ratified Richard's Conduct It Should Not Be Held
Vicariously Liable For The Punitive Damages Awarded Against Richards
Punitive damages are not intended to reward plaintiffs. Prince v. Peterson, 538

P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975). In Terry v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d
314 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated "[t]he purpose of a punitive or exemplary
damage award is not to compensate the party harmed but rather to punish the wrongdoer, to deter
him from similar acts in the future, and to provide fair warning to others similarly situated that
such conduct is not tolerated. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 278 (Utah 1982)
(emphasis added). In the instant case Wardley was not the wrongdoer. Holding Wardley
vicariously liable for the punitive damages awarded against Richards would frustrate two of the

three key purposes of punitive damages without impacting in anyway its only other purpose.
Wardley's willingness to be vicariously liable for the compensatory damages awarded against
Richards makes Brown whole. Forcing Wardley to pay for the punitive damages awarded
against Richards in this case would not punish Richards nor deter him from acting similarly in
the future. Justice requires that the punitive damage award rendered against Wardley be vacated
and that Richards be solely responsible to satisfy the punitive damage award rendered against
him.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above Wardley requests this Court to remand this case to
the trial court with instructions that the verdict against it be vacated, the claims against Wardley,
except for those regarding its vicarious liability for the damages directly caused by Richard's
wrongful conduct, be dismissed and that Wardley be held vicariously liable for only the verdict
for compensatory damages rendered against Richards.
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